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1 Introduction
The following is the second report on Angola under the Country Advisor
Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
(NORAD), and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and Nordic Consulting group
(NCG). In line with the original contract and Terms of Reference (see Appendix
2) the report consists of a Part I synthesising and assessing existing information
regarding economic, political and social developments in Angola, and a Part II
focussing on topics of relevance for Norwegian development aid to be specified
by NORAD. The primary purpose of the reports has been defined as being a
point of reference for internal discussions in MFA/NORAD, but they are also
made available to other institutions and individuals working with Angola
through the CMI Report Series.
Part I has, in accordance with the ToR, been kept relatively brief. Chapter 2
(“Poverty and Despair in the Midst of Plenty”) will give special emphasis to the
implications of Angola’s excessive urbanisation and HIV/AIDS; Chapter 3
(“Angola’s Irregular Economy”) will give special emphasis to the current
economic reform and the government’s increasing confidence as an actor in the
oil industry; Chapter 4 (“Angola’s Politics of Disorder”) will give special
emphasis to political alternatives for peace and the government’s apparent
social renunciation; and in Chapter 5 we will discuss development aid to
Angola, including the corporate social initiatives of the oil industry.
Part II of the study takes a closer look at the role of national and international
NGOs in Angola (see Appendix 3). The number of NGOs active in the country
has increased substantially since the introduction of the new democratic
constitution in 1991, with the current number of registered national NGOs
being 395 and international NGOs being 95. Since May 1991 the activities of
the NGOs have been regulated by the Law of Associations (Lei de Associação,
14/91). The immediate reason for NORAD’s wish to focus on NGOs is a new
law on NGOs (Aprova o Código das Organizações Não Governmentais) that
has been in the making since 1996 and was expected to pass the Council of
Ministers towards the end of 2000. As it turned out, the Law was stopped at
the last minute by the Council itself, but the issue of the status and role of
NGOs in Angola is still highly relevant given their dominant position in current
developments.
As part of its responsibility as country advisor on Angola, CMI has developed
an Angola web page (www.cmi.no). The page includes i) a presentation of CMI
as a resource institution on Angola; ii) a list of institutions working with Angola
in Norway; iii) internet links to relevant web pages dealing with Angola; and iv)
a selected and updated list of literature on Angola.
CMI is increasingly involved in Angola, and intends to enhance its involvement
in the years to come. To facilitate this, Chr. Michelsen Institute has entered into
an Agreement of Cooperation with the Angola-Instituto de Pesquisa Social e
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Económica (AIP). CMI personnel have also taken an active part in several
consultancy projects in Angola, as well as in the public debate on Angola in
Norway, particularly where related to Norwegian petroleum investments (CMI
2001).
Fieldwork for this study was carried out in the period between 8-18 January
2001. We would like to thank the staff at the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda
for their excellent support and willingness to share points of view during the
fieldwork period. Having said this, the analysis and assessments made are those
of the consultant and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of MFA/NORAD.
C M I
3
2 Poverty and Despair in the Midst of Plenty
As indicated in Table 1, Angola is a country characterised by extreme poverty
and despair, despite a large economic potential. As opposed to practically all
other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, moreover, most indicators have shown a
negative trend the past years. This is perhaps best illustrated by the persistent
drop in Angola’s Human Development Index ranking in recent years, despite
increasing income from oil and diamonds.1 In 2000, Angola ranked 160 out of
174 countries in terms of human development. Perhaps the most dramatic
expression of the severe socio-economic situation is the child mortality rate,
which implies that 292 out of 1000 children die before they are five years old,
and the low rate of enrolment in primary education, which implies a
problematic future for the large majority of those surviving their first five years.
UNICEF has recently declared Angola, together with Sierra Leone, as the worst
country in the world for children to grow up in (UNICEF 2000).
Table 1: Basic Social Indicators
INDICATOR VALUE
GDP per capita (USD) 438
Life expectancy at birth (years) 42
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 170
Child mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 292
Children 1 year vaccinated (%) 17
Infants with low birth weight, < 2.5 kg (%) 18
Children under 5 with malnutrition (stunted, %) 53
Population with access to safe water (%) 31
Population with access to adequate sanitation (%) 40
Net enrolment in basic education (%) 29
Pupils reaching fifth grade (%) 30
Adult literacy rate (men/women) (%) 30/50
HDI ranking (out of 174 countries) 160
Source: (Hodges 2001)
The extreme poverty in a rich country like Angola has long-term and complex
causes. 450 years of colonial rule under the Portuguese effectively segregated
the country in terms of race, class and regional idiosyncrasies. A centralised
political system after Independence in 1975 led to improved social conditions in
terms of education and health, but without creating the necessary economic
base for development. And the liberalisation of the Angolan economy since the
                                           
1 The Human Development Index is a composite index based on three indicators: longevity, as
measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, as measured by adult literacy and
combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios; and standard of living, as measured
by real GDP per capita in US dollars in purchasing power parity terms.
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early 1990s has increasingly detached a small economic elite from the large
majority of the Angolan population (Tvedten 1997; Hodges 2001).
Throughout Angolan history, war has had a negative impact on social processes
and conditions. Several hundred thousand people have died as a direct result of
the war only since 1992, and any development effort have been hampered by
the problematic security situation in the country. At the start of 2001 there
were 3.8 million internally displaced persons, representing close to 30 percent
of the population. 457,000 of these had fled their homes during the year 2000
(APM 2001). Although the war cannot alone explain the desperate situation in
which the large majority of Angolans find themselves, it has had a tremendous
impact on Angolan society.
The situation of extreme poverty and despair is currently maintained by a
complex set of factors ranging from political mismanagement and corruption,
via inherent problems in economies depending heavily on natural resources (the
“Dutch Disease”), to the low level of education in the country at large as well
as in the public sector (Tvedten 2000). While some commentators emphasise
signs of improvements in the living conditions of the Angolan population with
the current situation of relative peace (see below), others argue that there in fact
are no such signs (see Box 1).
Box 1
“The Angolan government claims that the situation in the country is returning to normal, but
this is a far cry from the reality witnessed by the MSF-teams working in nine provinces
throughout the country. In this new phase of the conflict, the population has been
increasingly subjected to the violence of war, abused, displaced and relocated according to
military strategies and political interests, exposed to epidemics and malnutrition”.
“It is not just the Angolan government that is speaking of “normalisation” in the country.
The international community and the United Nations echo this talk of new-found stability.
The World Food Programme (WFP) for example, is planning to redefine the beneficiaries of
its general food distribution, limiting recipients to those displace persons who accept
relocation by the government. Support from the international community in the form of
substantial economic investments, whose impact is only visible in Luanda and on the Atlantic
coast, make this fasede of stability possible”.
Source: (MSF 2000)
In any case, recent politico-military developments do make the current situation
particularly crucial for Angola. For the first time in decades there are options
for constructive policies and interventions, which puts a particularly heavy
responsibility on the Angolan government. Large parts of the country are still
marked by insecurity, but the situation has improved considerably since the
government’s military offensive in December 1999 and the subsequent removal
of UNITA from important strongholds throughout the country.
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As argued in the previous report (Tvedten 2000), moreover, the history of
Western involvement in the Angolan conflict during the Cold War, and the
grossly inadequate resources allocated through the United Nations during the
crucial transitional period towards peace and democracy in the early 1990s,2
also place a heavy responsibility on the international community to contribute
to a positive development.
Within the complex set of causes behind the severe socio-economic conditions
in Angola, two issues will be treated in more detail here. One is the excessive
rate of urbanisation, which has severe implications both for the national
economy and for social organisation and cultural perceptions. The second is the
issue of HIV/AIDS, which is serious but still not really acknowledged as such by
the Angolan government and in Angolan society.
2.1 Urbanisation
More than 50 percent of Angola’s population of 12-13 million people currently
live in cities and towns, as a result of a combination of push factors (war in
rural areas, lack of access to means of agricultural production etc.) and pull
factors (improved personal security, perceived better access to employment and
income etc.). An estimated 3.5 million people live in the capital city Luanda
alone, which is more than twice as many as in 1990 (Hodges 2001). No other
country in sub-Saharan Africa has such a large proportion of its population in
the capital city. Other regional centres have also experienced rapid population
growth, including Huambo, Benguela, Malange, Kuito and Lubango.
BOX 2
· There is an unequivocal correlation between urbanisation and economic development
and growth
· Urban areas play a significant role in the democratisation process, through political
mobilisation as well as local government;;
· There is a close link between urban and rural development, both in macro-economic
terms and through migration and urban-rural links.
· The proportion of women in migration flows to cities is increasing, and the urbanisation
process impacts significantly on the status and roles of women;
· The environmental problems facing developing countries are increasingly associated
with cities and urban centres;
· Poverty is increasingly an attribute of urbanisation, and urban poverty exhibits specific
features which needs to be understood better.
Source: Kamete, Tostensen and Tvedten 2001
                                           
2 Many will argue that the UN involvement in peace and reconstruction in Angola has generally
been nothing but unsuccessful. The first UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) arrived
in 1989 to verify the withdrawal of Cuban troops. UNAVEM II followed the Bicesse Accords of
1991 to monitor demobilisation and disarmament, and was replaced in 1995 by UNAVEM III
to assist implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. This was downgraded in June 1997 to the UN
Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), which formally ended its mission in March 1999 after
the Lusaka Process collapsed amid MPLA accusations that the UN presence had provided a
cover for UNITA to once again rearm during the cease-fire.
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The urbanisation process is part of a general trend in Africa, where more than
half the population will live in cities and towns by 2010 (Kamete, Tostensen
and Tvedten 2001). Generally such processes are seen to have both positive and
negative implications for development (see Box 2).
Urbanisation in Angola represents a special case in that it has been extremely
rapid and has taken place under very special circumstances. First of all it has
implied profound changes in class and ethnic relations. People from the main
ethnic groups, who traditionally have lived in different regions, now live next
door to each other. And the poor majority daily witness the affluence of the
economic elite in their lavish cars and houses frequenting expensive shops and
restaurants.3 Although studies of urban change are scarce (see van der Winden
1997, de Sousa 1998, Robson 2001), there are indications that this situation
has created serious social and political tension in many urban areas.
There are also indications that the process of urbanisation has led to a
fragmentation of social groups and networks such as the household, the
extended family, neighbourhoods and local associations (Robson 2001). This
has, in case, severely weakened the social capital of the poor. However, there
are also studies indicating that new strong networks have been created, e.g.
among women (van der Winden 1997).
Urban areas in Angola are further characterised by a near complete breakdown
of public institutions and services, very low levels of formal employment, lack
of access to proper dwellings, water, electricity and sewerage, and severe
problems of social unrest and violence. In fact, poor housing and physical
infrastructure seems to contribute significantly to the high rates of illness and
death in urban slum areas (UNDP 2000). Underlining this is the fact that such a
basic necessity as water (transported from rivers outside Luanda on trucks and
sold in small quantities to urban residents) is a major expense for poor
households.
For the large majority of urban Angolans, the informal economy is the
dominant source of employment and income as well as goods and services. Even
though the informal economy in Angola has rightly been portrayed as a vibrant
sector giving hope for future economic development, it is saturated and yields
very limited returns for the large majority of its participants. It is also
dominated by trade and service delivery, with very few productive enterprises
(de Sousa 1998).
One characteristic that makes the situation for the urban population in Angola
particularly severe is the difficulty of establishing and maintaining links with the
rural areas. Rural-urban relations are an important part of the coping strategies
in most other urban settings in sub-Saharan Africa. Limited exchanges of goods
and services make the urban population dependent on expensive urban
commodities, including foodstuffs. In other countries in the region, rural-urban
                                           
3 The richest stratum are collectively dubbed by many Angolans as “the 100 families” consisting
of the “old creoles” and the “new creoles” (Hodges 2001:37).
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links are also actively used to relieve social pressures, e.g. by sending urban
children to rural areas for education and by accommodating rural youngsters
seeking employment in town.
Table 2 contains some socio-economic indicators broken down for rural and
urban areas respectively. These demonstrate that the differences in HDI are
principally attributable to disparities of income and consumption, whereas the
distribution with respect to life expectancy and literacy is more even between
urban and rural areas. This shows that poverty and vulnerability in the urban
areas is severe, despite generally higher cash incomes.
Table 2. Urban-rural Discrepancies in Human Development.
INDICATOR URBAN RURAL
Income 535 (USD) 83 (USD)
Life expectancy at birth 42.0 42.0
Illiteracy rate 42.1 56.7
HDI 0.41 0.26
Source: UNDP 2000
An improvement in living conditions for the majority of Angolans will depend
on an alleviation of the pressure in urban areas, and a return to the countryside
of large parts of the most able-bodied population in order to recapture Angola’s
vast agricultural potential. Having said this, experience from urbanisation
processes in other countries in the region (and decades of international
development aid aimed at turning the “urban bias”) clearly indicate that people
having moved to town are not likely to move back to the rural areas. It remains
to be seen whether Angola’s special situation, with the combination of an
extreme urban poverty and a vast and under-utilised agricultural potential, will
make the country a special case in this respect.
2.2 HIV/AIDS
The HIV/AIDS epidemic will have a tremendous impact in urban as well as in
rural areas in Angola. The adult prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS is currently
estimated by UNAIDS at 2.78 percent (UNAIDS 2000), with national estimates
being 3.5 percent (UNICEF 2001). In accordance with the latter more than
200,000 adults are expected to become seropositive in the near future (United
Nations 2001:11).
The HIV/AIDS prevalence in Angola is very low compared to other countries in
the region (see Table 3), and it is uncertain whether this reflects the real
situation or is the outcome of limited political attention and a poor health
system not capturing the incidence of the fatal disease. In fact, the region of
Southern Africa continues to bear the brunt of the global epidemic. Nine of the
twelve most affected countries in the world are found in Southern Africa (the
other three are in East Africa). While some East African countries are beginning
to report declining rates of prevalence and positive changes in sexual behaviour
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among youth, the epidemic in Southern Africa has yet to show signs of abating
(UNAIDS 2000).
Table 3. Estimated Proportion and Number of People Living With HIV/AIDS,
2000
COUNTRY HIV/AIDS RATE HIV/AIDS NUMBER
Angola 2.78 15,000
Botswana 35.80 24,000
Congo 6.43 8,600
DRC 5.07 95,000
Lesotho 23.57 16,000
Malawi 15.96 70,000
Mozambique 13.22 98,000
Namibia 19,54 18,000
South Africa 19.94 250,000
Swaziland 25.25 7,100
Tanzania 8.09 140,000
Zambia 19.95 99,000
Zimbabwe 25.06 160,000
Source: UNAIDS 2000
Looking more closely at Angola, the National Aids Programme estimated in
1999 that 3.4 percent of the adult population (15-49 years) were infected by
HIV/AIDS compared with 1.06 percent in 1993 (Gilbert 1999). The report
outlines two scenarios. In Scenario 1 it is assumed that peace is established and
the government commitment and efforts to struggle against the propagation of
the HIV epidemic are efficient and generate good results. The prevalence is then
expected to reach 6.39 percent (or 620.380 directly affected) in 2009. In
Scenario 2, it is assumed that the government commitment and efforts are not
sufficient and that the war continues. This scenario implies that the prevalence
will increase rapidly to 10.05 percent (or 970.150 directly affected) in 2009.
In fact, Angola has not seen the kind of concerted efforts related to HIV/AIDS
as found, for example, in Namibia (UNDP 1997). This is partly related to the
overwhelming nature of other health problems that Angola faces,4 but the
Government has also under-communicated the seriousness of the epidemic. An
Angolan Aids Commission (CNLS) and a Technical Commission for Aids
(CNTS) were created in December 1997, but have not functioned
constructively. There are a number of initiatives by NGOs, UN agencies,
bilateral donors, private enterprises, churches and foundations, but a social and
economic problem of the scale and seriousness of HIV/AIDS makes a concerted
national effort necessary.
                                           
4 The main causes of death among children are malaria (38 percent), acute diarrhoea diseases
(14 percent) and measles (10 percent).
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The considerably higher prevalence of HIV/AIDS in neighbouring countries and
the weakness of the statistical base (only nine provinces out of 18 have the
capacity to carry out HIV tests, and in those that can the capacity is very
limited) make it likely that the estimates given above are conservative. There
does not, in fact, seem to be any compelling reason why transmission should be
less frequent in Angola than in other countries in the region. Some argue that
Angola is different due to the strong position of the Catholic Church, and that
the country has remained relatively isolated from the rest of the region due to
the continuous war situation. In fact, most of the commonly cited reasons for
the spread of the disease (social disintegration, changing sexual behaviour
among youngsters, limited access to and utilisation of contraceptives etc.) are
present in Angola, and relations with countries like Namibia and Zambia where
the disease is very prevalent have been extensive and increasing for many years.
Even with the conservative estimates, however, the impact of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic will be substantial. This is underlined by the fact that South Africa,
with a current HIV/AIDS rate of 20 percent, had a rate that was lower than
Angola’s only ten years ago. In addition to the social implications at the level of
the families and individuals directly affected, it will also have macro-economic
consequences which will make economic recovery in Angola even more
difficult: rising social costs, lower consumption and saving, reduction in
agricultural capacity, rising costs of industrial production, lower surpluses in
the private sector etc. (DANIDA 2000:20). African countries where less than 5
percent of the population are affected are currently experiencing a modest
impact on their GDP growth rates. As the HIV prevalence rate rises to 20
percent or more, however, GDP growth rates may decline up to 2 percent per
year (UNAIDS 2000). 5
                                           
5 See UNDP 1998 for a thorough assessment of the social and economic impact of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Namibia (UNDP 1998)
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3. Angola’s Irregular Economy
Angola has huge oil resources and an even larger potential, and is currently
considered to be the most promising oil production area in the world (EIU
2001). Production has increased from 690,000 b/d in 1996 to 850,000 b/d in
2000, with an estimated production of 1.5 mn b/d in 2004 (The Economist, 5
October 2000). Despite this, the country suffers from a large current account
deficit, an equally large public sector deficit, high inflation rates, and a huge
foreign debt. Other sectors in the economy, with the exception of the diamond
sector and an emerging Luanda-based construction sector, have been at a
virtual standstill for years with few if any signs of improvement. Key economic
indicators are given in Table 4.
The past year has been dominated by two interrelated developments. One is the
introduction of an economic reform programme, in which the vested interests
both of the Angolan government and of key international actors, including the
IMF, seem to be stronger than under previous programmes. A second is the
increasing confidence of the government vis-à-vis the oil sector, as evidenced by
their controversial plan to restrict the rate of growth in oil production and their
demand for increasing signature bonuses from international oil companies.
Table 4: Key Economic Indicators
INDICATOR 1998 1999 2000
Gross Domestic Product (USD bn) 4.5 5.0 4.9
Real GDP Growth (%) 3.2 2.7 4.9
Consumer price inflation (%) 107.3 248.2 316.0
Trade balance (USD mn) 1,464 2,683 5,500
Current account balance (USD mn) -1,005 -727 -100
Foreign exchange reserves (USD mn) 203.5 496.1 401.0
Total external debt (USD bn) 12.2 11.9 11.5
Debt service ratio (%) 36.6 18.2 13.6
Source: EIU (2000)
The reform programme and the oil sector are interlinked through the unlikely
bedfellows of the International Monetary Fund and Human Rights
Organisations (such as Global Witness), and their efforts to enforce larger
transparency in the oil economy both from the government and from the
international oil companies.
3.1 Economic Reforms
During the past 13 years, there have been no less than nine different economic
reform programmes in Angola, some lasting barely a year and in one case only
a few weeks. Seven of these have been described as broadly reformist in nature,
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and two as clearly anti-reformist, reversing previously implemented reforms
(Hodges 2001:102). Assessments of the evolution of some of these programmes
shows a pattern in which an initial burst of reforming energy has resulted in the
partial implementation of the proposed measures, usually without adequate
policy co-ordination, followed by setbacks often resulting from the lack of
consistency in the measures, political interventions from above to halt the
reforms, and then a period of drift or partial reversal of the reforms.
Following years of failure, a new economic team was appointed in 1999,
including the Central Bank Governor Aguinaldo Jaime and the Minster of
Finance Joaquim David, that was given greater authority to run economic
policy. With reference to policy statements by and confidence in the new
economic team, the IMF signed a long-anticipated nine-month Staff-Monitored
Programme with the Government in April 2000. Key aspects of the programme
are to establish macro-economic stability, promote poverty reduction and
dismantle the state controls and distortions that have enabled widespread
corruption and inefficiency. 6
In a mid-term review carried out in October 2000, it was concluded that the
Angolan government had initiated several structural reforms, even though there
were still few concrete results. Among the reforms were a diagnostic study of
the oil sector, to be done by the international consulting company KPMG, that
has been contracted for a period of 30 months. The goal is to improve
transparency and create management capacity that permits a continuous
monitoring of the income from oil. The IMF has been less pleased with the
cooperation of the international oil companies in enhancing transparency, a
situation which now seems to be changing due to strong external pressure (see
below).
Less had been done with poverty alleviation and social policy. The Interim
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, currently an important feature of the IMF's
programmes in most developing countries, had not really been initiated except
for the establishment of certain inter-ministerial working groups. As appears
from Table 5, the allocation of economic resources to social sectors remains
very low with no clear indications of improvement at the time of writing in
early 2001. 7
Despite the slow pace of progress, the IMF and the Angolan Government are
likely to reach an agreement. The deadline for the I-PRSP has been set to April
2001, and for the entire IMF Staff Monitored Programme to June 2001. With
such an agreement, a continuation of the reform in the form of a “Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility Program” (PRGF) is likely. Equally important
for the Angolan government is that an agreement will open the way for
renegotiations of the terms for the country’s large foreign debt. As regards the
                                           
6 Mr. David was replaced as Minister of Finance by Julio Bassa at the initiation of the reform
programme.
7 If enhanced allocations to social sectors do take place, commentators warn that this should be
assessed over time to mitigate against a merely temporary shift in response to adhere to
expectations from IMF and other pressure groups.
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IMF, a number of key member countries with vested interests in Angola are
interested in an IMF-monitored programme in order to enhance the country’s
international legitimacy.
Table 5: Government Expenditure by Function (% of total expenditures)
TYPE OF EXPENDITURE 1997 1998 1999
General public services 17.8 18.3 16.1
Defence and public order 40.0 27.2 41.0
Peace process 0.6 0.0 0.1
Education 5.0 6.2 4.8
Health 3.1 3.3 2.8
Economic affairs and services 18.7 13.4 10.3
Interest (commitments basis) 10.0 16.6 10.7
Other (recorded but
unclassified)
- 0.5 12.6 12.4
Source: IMF (2000)
3.2 The Oil Industry
Oil is still alfa and omega in the Angolan economy, representing 61.4 percent of
GDP and 88 percent of exports in 1999 (EIU 2001).8 Total production in 2000
was 850,000 b/d. This makes Angola the second largest producer of oil in
Africa, after Nigeria. Angola is expected to become the largest producer in
Africa by 2005, with a total production of 1.3 mn b/d. The country will receive
USD 3.5 bn of investment from the international oil industry each year for the
next ten years.9
At the same time, a substantial proportion of the oil revenue (estimated at 40
percent by the IMF) never finds its way into the state budgets. The net foreign
exchange revenue averaged USD 2.2 bn a year between 1996 and 1999.
Through various mechanisms, large sums of money bypass the Treasury and are
used for direct payments to cover the costs of the war with UNITA, debt
servicing of poor loans at high interest rates, and (according to Global Witness
and other observers) high-level corruption. Little has, in other words, so far
found its way to the development of Angolan society.
The discovery by Elf Aquitaine of the deepwater Girassol field in 1996 marked
the start of a new era in Angolan oil exploration. Over 20 major discoveries
since then have added over 8 bn barrels of recoverable oil reserves to the 3.3 bn
                                           
8 Official diamond exports represented 11 percent, which is sharply higher than in previous
years.
9 According the Economist Intelligence Unit (2000), the Angolan authorities forecast
investments of between USD 4-5 bn per year in the period 2000-2003..
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barrels estimated in 1996 (EIU 2000).10 By mid-2000, 21 exploration licences
for blocks had been awarded.
Originally, foreign companies became contractors to the state oil company
Sonangol through Production Sharing Agreements, where the former financed
investment costs in full and both shared the excess “profit oil” on a sliding scale
linked to cumulative production. In the late 1990s, however, the Government
increasingly sought non-recoverable down payments in the form of so-called
“signature bonuses” on oil contracts. An estimated USD 300 mn was reaped
from each of the highly promising ultra-deep blocks 31-33 in 1999.11 Another
sign of the increasing confidence of the government and Sonangol is recent
policy statements to the effect of slowing down the rate of increase in oil
production in order to conserve resources.
The most important international oil companies in Angola in terms of share of
production are Chevron, TotalFina-Elf and BP-Amoco. The Norwegian
companies Norsk Hydro (Blocks 5, 9, 17 and 34) and Statoil (Blocks 15, 17
and 31) are also involved, and will invest NOK 3-5 bn per year in the country
over the coming five to ten years. Block 34 is the fourth and last ultra deep
block on offer for some time to come. The licence is to be operated by
Sonangol, in partnership with Norsk Hydro as technical advisor. Hydro and
Sonangol have shares of 30 and 20 percent respectively.12 All the big oil
companies are currently scrambling for the remaining 50 percent of the block.
In addition to the Norwegian oil companies, Norwegian service and supply
companies such as FMC-Kongsberg Offshore, Kværner Oil and Gas, Aker
Maritime, Petroleum Geo Services, Fred Olsen Production and Stolt Offshore
are also involved in the Angolan oil sector. Stolt Offshore has recently become
one of the major actors in oil industry supplies in the country. The central role
of the relatively small Norwegian oil companies in Angola has received
international attention (see Box 3 ).
Oil companies have recently been under considerable pressure to contribute to
more transparency both by the International Monetary Fund, and by influential
NGOs (such as Global Witness) and Angolan interest groups.13 An example of
the latter is the small political party PADRA, which recently distributed
                                           
10 Globally, companies hope to strike oil with four of every ten exploration wells drilled. In
Angola’s deep-sea blocks 14, 15, 17 and 18, that strike rate has been almost ten out of ten (The
Economist, 8 June 2000).
11 Signature payments are distributed among the oil companies in accordance with their share in
the relevant block. In line with this, Statoil paid NOK 452 mn for their 13,33% share in Block
31.
12 The technical challenge in Block 34 is no small deal. Technology does not yet exist to produce
oil from under 2,500 metres of water (the world’s deepest significant sub-sea oil production is
currently in the Gulf of Mexico, at water depths of 1,200 metres) (The Economist, 8 June
2000).
13 In a recent development, a UN Under-secretary-general for Africa has also asked the oil
companies to be “allies in the peace process” by using their influence with the Angolan
government to help peace initiatives (EIU 2001:23). As argued elsewhere (Nordås, Tvedten and
Wiig 2000), care should be taken in involving companies with vested economic interests and no
particular competence in issues of development and human rights in such matters.
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pamphlets and went on hunger strike to draw attention to the government’s
role in the Elf scandal and charged that it is deliberately prolonging the war in
order to pillage the country’s rich natural resources (The Economist, 28
February 2001).
Box 3
[Norway, which has had an energy cooperation agreement with Angola since 1987 and
shares with it massive oil production rates compared to population, has been very
influential. Norway’s advice covers three areas]:
“Firstly, long-term management of oil reserves is a priority under a new bilateral agreement
signed in August [2000] with Norway’s Petroleum Directorate, which has helped improve
management and draw up new regulations. This has influenced the slow-down [on the
development of offshore oilfields] and follows three ministerial level visits to Angola in the
last three years.
Secondly, oil minister Botelho de Vasconcelos says that Angola will follow Norway in
keeping close to, but apart from, OPEC, giving Luanda the freedom to choose when to cut
production in support of higher oil prices.
Thirdly, Angola is pressuring oil companies to use Sonangol joint ventures as contractors,
again copying Norway for building a local oil industry from scratch. Major companies
prefer to choose their contractors on the open market, but Angolan officials insist this is the
only way to build a local industry.
Backed by the Norwegian government-industry association INTSOK, Norwegian
companies [] have won contracts in Angola. Norway is also advising on the crippling
“Dutch Disease” which can inflict mineral-rich countries when a surge of money into state
accounts can destroy a non-oil industrial base and worsen mis-management. Norway has
established an “oil-fund” to avoid this and to manage fluctuations in the world price. This
will, however, be difficult in Angola where billions of dollars of oil revenue have been
diverted into unorthodox financing schemes and massive arms purchases”.
Source: Africa Confidential 2000 Vol.41, No 24.
However, the companies, including Norsk Hydro and Statoil, have hitherto not
been willing to contribute to such an increased transparency with reference to
their competitive position, even though such information is mandatory when
operating in Norway or other western countries.14 British Petroleum has
recently changed its attitude despite the risks implied for its position in Angola
if other companies do not follow suit (see Box 4, also the Economist, 13
February 2001).
The oil wealth has reduced the leverage of western international organisations
and creditors to influence economic policies through the normal
conditionalities, which is why the oil companies themselves have been drawn in.
Larger transparency and control of the oil income is necessary for
                                           
14 Norsk Hydro and Statoil were challenged on these points by Simon Taylor of Global Witness
in a meeting organised by Norwegian Forum for Environment and Development on 10 October
2000.
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accountability, improved resource management and ultimately Angola’s socio-
economic recovery and development. Similar arguments around oil wealth
being a national resource rather than a resource belonging to the national elite
and international capital has, of course, also been at the very core of Norwegian
oil policies.
Box 4
“Global Witness has long argued that the oil companies operating in Angola, but which are
not transparent about their payments to the government, are complicit in the wholesale
robbery of the Angolan State. This is because they are not providing data about their
payments to the Angolan government when they clearly could do so - in stark contrast to the
data they already provide in their reports in the developing world.
BP is the first company to recognise that this situation must change, providing a useful step
in the process of matching company practise to the rhetoric of the company re-branding
process. In a letter dated 6th February 2001 to Global Witness BP Group Managing Director
Richard Olver stated in addition to maintaining a regular dialogue with the World Bank and
IMF over Angola, that the company would publish the following information annually on
their operations in Angola:
1. Total net production by Block
2. Aggregate payments by BP to Sonangol in respect of PSA terms.
3. Total taxes and levies paid by BP to the Angolan government as a result of their
operations.
4. Signature Bonus payments to Angola
“BP have made an excellent move”, said Simon Taylor of Global Witness. ”This will not
have been an easy decision for them, but it is clear that they have recognised the need to end
corporate complicity in the state rip-off we are seeing in Angola today. It follows that there
are now no excuses for the other companies in Angola not to do the same. So to that end, we
are challenging the leadership of other responsible oil companies to publish this data”.
Source: Global Witness Press release, 12 February 2001.
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4. Angola’s Politics of Disorder
Political developments in Angola in 2000 have been characterised by a military
situation increasingly in favour of the Government, and a presidency trying to
balance pressures for dialogue and reconciliation with its own preference for a
tougher stand against Savimbi and UNITA’s military wing.
Internationally, Angola has moved more troops to the Democratic Republic of
Congo, filling the vacuum which followed the death of President Cabila 16
January 2001. The new president is believed to have close links with the
Angolan government, and the succession has consolidated Angola’s position as
a regional power. Tension between Angola and its other neighbours over the
spread of the civil war across their borders has declined in recent months, as the
government has come to feel more confident militarily.
Since government forces took over UNITA strongholds in the central highlands
(Andulo and Bailundo) in late 1999, UNITA has been gradually weakened.
Towards the end of 2000 several UNITA bases along the Zambian border were
captured, putting even more pressure on UNITA’s ability to supply itself.
UNITA has also been weakened by a number of key military personnel either
having disappeared or defected. UNITA does maintain the ability to carry out
more traditional guerrilla warfare and launch raids against government–held
areas, but does not any longer represent a serious threat to the government’s
grip on power.
With the recent military developments, the chance to capture Jonas Savimbi is
growing. This would put the government in an even stronger position both
militarily and politically, and make a negotiated solution to the current
situation of no-peace-no-war more palatable. However, some commentators
argue that Savimbi is more valuable to the government as a weak but free than
as a captured political opponent. A stabilised military situation will put more
pressure on the government to adhere to the democratic constitution, and to
enhance their efforts for socio-economic development.
President Eduardo dos Santos still has a firm grip on power, with his “inner
circle” maintaining influence at the expense of the Parliament, the Government
and the Judiciary as the other pillars of Angola’s democratic constitution.
Following a long-term tradition of sidelining potential political opponents (with
the prime ministers Marcolino Moco and Lopo de Nascimento and several
Ministers of Finance as recent examples), the popular and long-serving head of
the armed forces João de Matos was sacked in February 2001.
In fact, the current political situation in Angola seems to fit well with what has
been called the “politics of disorder (Chabal and Daloz 1999): “A generalised
system of patrimonialism and an acute degree of apparent disorder, as
evidenced by a high degree of governmental and administrative inefficiency, a
lack of institutionalisation, a general disregards of formal political and
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economic sectors, and a universal resort to personal(ized) and vertical solutions
to societal problems”.
Despite the strong position of the political authorities in Angola, however, they
are under pressure for enhanced democratisation and social responsibility both
domestically and internationally. One type of pressure concerns the issue of
how to relate to UNITA as the main political opponent and “representative” of
the Ovimbundu as the largest ethno-linguistic group in the country. And a
second is the pressure to increase its social responsibility, first and foremost
through larger allocations to health and education.
4.1 Return to Lusaka or Dialogue?
The Government has responded to pressures for democratic accountability by
opening the way for new presidential and parliamentary elections in 2001
(recently officially postponed until 2002).15 While the weakened position of
Unita, the government’s control of Unita defectors in Unita-Renovada in
Luanda and the continued absence of credible third political forces in Angolan
politics would make this feasible, elections will probably not take place in the
foreseeable future. The security situation is too difficult in parts of the country
to carry out such a process, and despite the lack of alternatives the government
is uncertain about whether the population will give it the necessary vote of
confidence.
With elections and a “fresh start” unlikely, the government is under pressure to
chose one of two alternative strategies. On the one hand there is pressure for
dialogue and reconciliation, mainly from Angolan church organisations and
external Human Rights movements. Several initiatives have been taken
(including the Pro Paz Movement and the COIEPA committee for peace), and
the churches are widely considered as the only political force in Angola with the
political strength to have an impact on national politics. The concern of the
churches is not solely with high level politics, but also with what they consider a
deep split in the Angolan population following the events after the elections in
1992 (Castello 2000).
The government for its part keeps reminding critics that it is a rightfully elected
government, and that the Lusaka Protocol in essence was an attempt at
reconciliation giving considerable concessions to UNITA as the losing party of
both the Parliamentary and Presidential elections (see Table 7).16 Moreover, key
principles of the Lusaka Protocol have been translated into reality: Angola’s
multi-party national assembly, a government of national unity, and integrated
armed forces. The government also points out that Unita has used all previous
                                           
15 The Angolan Constitution states that Parliamentary elections shall be held every 4 years and
that a President can sit maximum two periods. The last elections were held in September 1992.
16 The Lusaka Agreement was formulated under strong pressure from Western countries where
victory in Parliamentary or Presidential elections normally implies rights to establish single-
party governments. Despite this, pressure was strong on the MPLA to include UNITA in
government.
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attempts at negotiated settlements to rearm and prepare to take over power by
force, and that they cannot be trusted. 17
Table 7: Results Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, September 1992.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION
Candidate Votes (%) Party Members of
Parliament
Jose Eduardo dos Santos 49.57 MPLA 129
Jonas Savimbi 40.07 UNITA 70
Alberto Neto 2.16 PRC 6
Holden Roberto 2.11 FNLA 5
Others 6.09 Others 9
Total 100.00 Total 219
Source: Tvedten 1997
Irrespective of new elections, which may change the political map but are
unlikely to change the real distribution of power, a final political settlement is
likely to be based on a combination of the principles grounded in the Lusaka
Protocol and efforts for reconciliation. As argued in the first report, however,
none of these strategies are likely to be successfully implemented as long as
Jonas Savimbi remains in control of Unita (Tvedten 2000).
4.2 Social Renunciation
The apparently limited attention and concern in the Angolan government for
the severe social problems in the country is receiving increasing attention both
nationally and internationally. The most common point of reference for this
criticism is the extremely low budget allocations to the social sectors, primarily
education and health (see Table 8). The allocations of 2.5 percent and 1.5
percent to education and health respectively are also low compared to other
countries in the region (neighbouring Namibia allocates 25 percent to education
alone). As of the beginning of 2001, there are no signs of substantial changes in
the allocation of economic resources to health and education.
Table 8: Government expenditures on social sectors (Percent of GDP)
SECTOR 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Education 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.5
Health 3.3 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.5
Source: EIU 2001
                                           
17 Most foreign governments involved in Angola support this stand, either as a matter of
principle or for strategic reasons related to their role in the oil industry.
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The government has hitherto argued that economic resources have been needed
for military expenses to protect the nation’s sovereignty against the rebel
movement Unita, and that Angola’s heavy debt on poor terms has limited its
room for manoeuvre. Counter-arguments have been that the need for heavy
military investments have decreased, that better loan conditions would have
been obtained if the government had pursued a more constructive economic
policy, and that too large parts of the national income are unaccounted for.
Some analysts argue that the lack of allocations to social sectors is not
necessarily a sign of social renunciation, but that many key decision-makers are
entangled in the system of disorder and dependencies that inhibit action
(“politics of disorder”). Others argue that a political elite culture is being
developed, in which key political actors detach themselves from the immense
and apparently insurmountable social problems in Angola.
What seems to be taking place is an allocation of responsibility for socio-
economic development to other stakeholders. During the war the government
came to rely heavily on multilateral and bilateral aid organisations and
international NGOs for emergency relief and social development. While this
still continues (see Chapter 5), recent developments indicate that the
government wants to recapture social credibility by bypassing its own public
structures and establish separate semi-public structures to be funded by
international oil capital.
The Eduardo dos Santos Foundation (FESA) was established in 1996. Portrayed
as a philanthropic non-profit venture modelled on the private foundations in
the developed world, FESA officially aims to complement the actions of
government by promoting social welfare and economic development. FESA has
been heavily criticised for being a “private state in the state” and detached from
other social development efforts (Messiant 1999). In 1999 the government
launched the National Emergency Programme for Humanitarian Assistance
(PNEAH) with a secretariat in the Ministry of Planning, and USD 55 million in
government funding. And in 2000, an Economic and Social Development Fund
was established to be co-ordinated by Sonangol and funded by international oil
capital (Hodges 2001).
Without an overall government responsibility and an efficient public system for
education and health, however, interventions from aid organisations, NGOs,
social funds, oil companies etc. may easily remain uncoordinated and
dispatched. Development programmes and projects implemented by external
actors will continue to be important, but cannot replace national public policies
and structures.
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5. Development Aid and Social Funds
Development aid to Angola takes place in a context where income from oil is
increasing, at the same time as the social situation for the population is
deteriorating (see Figure 1). As argued in the first annual report (Tvedten 2000),
this should represent a dilemma for aid organisations like NORAD with its
strong emphasis on concentrating support to countries with transparent and
accountable governments and a favourable human rights record (NORAD
1999).
Figure 1: Oil Income and Human Development
Sources: Derived from EIU and UNDP.
The most recently available OECD/DAC data, which excludes non-government
organisations, put net development assistance to Angola at USD 387.5 mn in
1999. Of this USD 251.8 mn was bilateral aid, and USD 135.7 mn multilateral
aid. This represented aid per capita of USD 27.9, which was USD 18 (or 40
percent) less than the average for the Southern African region (UNDP 2000).
The United States, Spain, Italy, Japan and Norway are currently the largest
bilateral donors, with the European Union, IDA (The World Bank) and the
World Food Programme and being the largest multilateral donors (see Table 9).
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Table 9: Net Official Development Assistance 1996-1999 (USD million)
BILATERAL
DONORS
1997 1998 1999 MULTILATE-
AL DONORS
1997 1998 1999
United States 22.0 28.8 48.1 EU 70.2 65.4 53.0
Spain 30.9 25.2 35.8 IDA 27.9 35.8 38.8
Italy 9.2 11.0 25.0 WFP 13.5 2.7 27.6
Japan 12.0 17.9 22.0 UNDP 7.7 7.6 7.5
Portugal 29.4 23.9 19.8 UNICEF 3.9 4.9 -
Norway 24.5 23.1 19.8 UNHCR 0.1 0.5 1.6
Germany 15.7 11.8 18.0 Others 8.3 8.7 7.2
Sweden 27.8 22.5 17.8
Others 92.0 91.0 110.5
Total 227.0 214.5 251.8 Total 127.7 120.7 135.7
Source: OECD, forthcoming 2001
The bulk of international development assistance to Angola is still in the form
of emergency relief, with transitional aid becoming gradually more important
and long-term development aid still being limited. This is related partly to the
needs of the country, but also to the policies of the aid organisations present in
the country. There is currently political pressure from the government for a
stronger emphasis on programmes supporting self-reliance (EIU 2001).
Another important characteristic of the aid to Angola is the heavy geographical
concentration in Luanda and a few other major provinces (such as Huambo,
Bié, Benguela and Huíla). The concentration is the combined outcome of the
patterns of war and the preferences of international agencies to “stay where the
others are”. Some argue that the geographical concentration is contributing
towards the development of “first rate” and “second rate” provinces already
implicit in government policies and financial allocations, potentially having
severe implications for a further regionalisation of Angola.
A final characteristic to be mentioned is the problems related to government
coordination of external aid. Emergency and development aid is formally
coordinated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) and
the Ministry of Planning respectively, but the responsibility is in reality vested
with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Having said this, there
are reports that the cooperation between the Angolan authorities and the aid
organisations has improved at provincial levels (SIDA 2000).
The aid picture in Angola is complicated by the activities of semi-private
Angolan development funds and international oil companies, often detached
from mainstream government policies and development assistance.
Oil companies contribute large sums of money to social and economic
development funds, joint projects with Sonangol and FESA (see above). The size
of the social funds and other related social activities planned and implemented
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by the Angolan petroleum authorities are difficult to ascertain. There are
apparently a number of different funds (social development funds, educational
funds, small-scale industry funds etc.), and transparency is limited. Well-placed
people in the multilateral development organisations argue that there are
accumulated funds of USD 200 mn from Blocks 31-33 alone (which is nearly
twice the annual multilateral aid budget). The oil companies themselves argued
during a meeting with NGOs hosted by the UK Foreign Office Minister Peter
Hain in October 2000 that what they call the Sonangol Development Fund had
a total revenue of USD 40 mn (pers.comm. Simon Tailor, Global Witness). Yet
others (such as the well-connected international NGO Development Aid from
People to People, DAPP) argued that USD 12 mn is set aside for social
development from each signature bonus.
The potential importance of, and uncertainty around, the size of the social
funds is a topic of concern for multilateral and bilateral aid organisations, as
well as international and national NGOs. Many actively try to position
themselves in order to gain access to the money in question. Their argument is
that the utilisation of such funds has to be better incorporated into the overall
development policy of the government as well as of development organisations,
and that they should be used by organisations with sufficient professional skills
and experience. Sonangol seems to realise that its has limited competence and
capacity to carry out development interventions, and is currently seeking
alternative partners for project implementation varying from national NGOs to
huge international consulting companies like the US-based Chemonics
International (www. chemonics.com). 18
Finally, the oil companies also carry out their own development activities as
part of their Corporate Social Responsibility. Projects are primarily related to
the oil sector in the form of education and training, cultural programmes and
sports, but they also carry out development projects in more traditional terms.
Most of these projects are planned and implemented without relating to other
mainstream development efforts, in order to fulfil the companies’ need to make
their interventions visible in the political landscape both in Angola and in their
home countries. Again BP seems to be the most professional oil company, with
an elaborate social development strategy and close relations with people
knowing Angola well such as their policy advisor Shawn McCormick and Alex
Vines of the Human Rights Watch.
5.1 Norwegian Development Aid
Norwegian aid to Angola was NOK 153,966 mn in 1999 (see Table 10).
Norway has continued to concentrate its aid around humanitarian assistance
and the sectors of energy, education and fisheries, and Norwegian non-
governmental organisations remain important channels of implementation (see
Chapter 6).
                                           
18 The search for partners primarily takes place informally, but Sonangol has also e.g. advertised
for relevant institutions in the Jornal de Angola.
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Within the complex Angolan political setting and the dilemmas referred to
above, Norway has managed to develop an important position as an
international actor and donor. The main reason for this is the high profile and
active networking of the Embassy, which has created a basis that is important
not only for Norwegian aid interventions but also for the Norwegian oil
industry (a fact that does not seem to be sufficiently realised by the companies
themselves). Norway had the opportunity to play an even more active and
constructive role for peace and reconstruction in Angola through its new
position as a member of UN Security Council, but this was forfeited when
taking on the responsibility for sanctions against Iraq.
Table 10: Norwegian Development Aid to Angola by Budget Item (NOK mn)
NORWEGIAN DELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE
1997 1998 1999
Long-term development cooperation 79,454 96,907 96,142
Extended cooperation 63 1,837 -
Non-government organisations 10 ,408 11,666 2,230
Experts and consultants 42 - 230
Industrial and commercial financing
facilities
43,169 8 ,935 -
Multi-bilateral assistance 175 722 -
Research and human resource
development
- - -
Humanitarian assistance 39,859 54, 389 56,321
Peace, reconciliation and democracy 19 - - -
Debt relief - - -
Instalment on loans - - - 1,250
Norfund - - -
Others 32 110 293
Total 173,182 174, 566 153,966
Source: NORAD 1999a.
Norwegian aid to Angola currently shows a constructive “mix” of emergency
aid (such as support to the World Food Programme); transitional support (such
as the TEP educational packages implemented through the Norwegian Refugee
Council); long-term development aid (such as the health programmes
implemented by Norwegian Peoples Aid); and a number of initiatives related to
peace, reconciliation and human rights (such as the support to the peace
initiative by Development Workshop). This does not mean that there is not
room for improvement, but Norway is an important donor in Angola with an
aid profile well adapted to a difficult context.20
                                           
19 Considerable parts of Norway’s humanitarian assistance are in fact allocated to peace,
reconciliation and democracy, but this is inadequately captured in the structure for budget
allocations.
20 A closer assessment of the projects is beyond the scope of this report. See Endresen 1999 and
Johannessen 2000 for recent evaluations of some of the main programmes.
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Norfund is in the process of establishing itself in Angola, with a venture fund of
USD 20 mn (of which USD 5 mn comes from Norfund itself). Norfund makes
risk capital investments in developing countries, concentrating on equity capital
for investments in local investment funds and industries. As a first step a Fund
Management Company will be established in the first half of 2001.
Cooperation in Angola will be established with local industrial partners and
private banks, and further cooperation will be sought with national and
international private companies primarily in the onshore petroleum sector.
Norwegian oil companies are involved in development interventions through
their contributions to social development funds, which altogether represent
considerable sums of money (see above). In addition, they also have their own
interventions as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility strategies. Norsk
Hydro uses a total of USD 500,000 on projects on its own initiative (see Table
11). Statoil, which globally uses more resources on social activities than Hydro,
has a smaller portfolio in Angola (Nordås, Tvedten and Wiig 2000). They spent
NOK 2 mn (approx. USD 230,000) in 2000 (see Table 12).
Table 11: Development Projects, Norsk Hydro (2000)
PROJECT BUDGET (USD)
Sports Sponsorships (Norway Cup, Verket Cup, Mini-Tennis etc.) 57,400
Luanda Sul Community Development 183,000
Educational programmes, incl. Methodist Church/PASOCA 50,700
FESA 100,000
International Child Development Programme (ICDP) 30,000
Culture (book translation, boat to cultural festival in Norway etc.) 23,500
Other activities (including social fundraising) 8,250
Micro-credit schemes/fertilisers 45,000
Total 497,850
Source: Norsk Hydro.
Table 12: Development Projects, Statoil Angola (2000)
PROJECT BUDGET (USD)
Norwegian Peoples Aid 115,000
Palanca Boys Home 57,400
UNOA/HR 57,400
Humanitarian Contingency 21                    -
Total 229,800
Source: Statoil.
                                           
21 A contingency of NOK 1,000,000 was not used in 2000.
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The challenges for the companies are to find a balance between contributing
constructively to social development, and their own (legitimate) need to be
visible donors. The former may be easiest to achieve by channelling funds
through professional and experienced development organisations (including
international and national NGOs), while the latter easily leads companies to
carry out development interventions on their own or through high-profile
institutions such as FESA with dubious development implications. 22
Our impression is that the Norwegian companies are still struggling to find the
right balance and approach in their social interventions, albeit with differences
between the two companies. While Norsk Hydro has a policy of not
channelling support via traditional aid channels, Statoil channels as much as
possible of their support through the UN system and/or NGOs. The recent
donation of NOK 1 mn from Statoil to the Norwegian Refugee Council is in
accordance with this policy.
                                           
22 Norsk Hydro uses FESA actively, while Statoil is not a member. There are also indications
that BP is in the process of pulling out of the Foundation.
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6. The Status and Role of National and
International NGOs
NGOs are an important part of civil society and the development process in
Angola. They have emerged and developed during a very brief period of time,
starting with the democratisation and liberalisation of the early 1990s and the
passing of the Law of Associations in May 1991. Prior to this there were no
formally recognised NGOs in the country, and the very notion of NGOs was
largely unknown.23 In early 2001 the number of formally recognised national
and international NGOs has surged to 365 and 95 respectively. It is generally
agreed that the real number of NGOs and Community Based Development
Organisations (CBDOs) is considerably higher.
The growth of the NGO sector has important implications for their status and
role in Angolan society. There is a tendency, particularly among international
actors, to regard NGOs as all good and all beneficial, and to define national
governments that do not give them space as “anti-development”, “anti-
democracy” and “anti-human rights”. 24 However, it is also important to assess
the status and role of NGOs from the point of view of the national governments
and other national stakeholders, and see NGOs as part of a complex setting of
rapid political change (see Box 5).
Box 5
“Angola ten estado a conheser o despoletar de várias ONGs nacionais e estrangeiras.
Muitas perseguem objectivos complicados, outras difusos, mas tudo tem a ver com a falta
de um lei das ONGs ou outro documentos que regulamente a sua actividade. O seu
discurso muitas vezes ruidoso, ainda que vago,em favor dos pobres, do pleno emprego e de
oposição á guerra e as minas é, para algumas destas organizações, mais uma ambição para
a obstenção de projecção internacional, do que de uma verdadeira solidariedade e ajuda.
No nosso país aporaram muitas ONGs que, de repente, passaram do campo da
solidariedade, para o empresarial, mas mantendo o mesmo estatuto e as mesmas
facilidades, tais como a isenção aduaneira e fiscal dos artigos e produtos importados, que
são canalizaos para a comercialização. E evidente que os ganhos são elevados e a
concorrençia com os outros operadores económicos real”.
Source: Folha 8, 26 December 2000
                                           
23 There were some international NGOs such as Development Workshop that had been
recognised through cooperation accords with the Ministry of External Relations since 1987, but
most were defined as solidarity organisations and their personnel as cooperantes. Some national
church organisations also implemented development projects and functioned as development
NGOs, but were not perceived as such.
24 This tendency refers not only to their role in developing countries. Norwegian NGOs receive
at least 80 percent of their funding from the Norwegian government. Despite this, they are
largely left in peace and not subject to the same scrutiny as e.g. bilateral development
programmes.
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We will argue in the following section that both international and national
NGOs have an important role in Angola, so far particularly in the areas of
emergency and development assistance but increasingly also of democratisation
and human rights. This is as it should be both with reference to the need for an
active civil society, and the inability (or unwillingness) of the Angolan state to
fill necessary social functions. At the same time we will argue for a greater
sensitivity as regards the position and role particularly of international NGOs in
Angolan society. While they have important emergency and development
functions, it is also their responsibility to relate constructively to existing public
structures despite their deficiencies and to support more actively the
development of an Angolan civil society and NGO sector.
6.1 Some Conceptual Clarifications
There is considerable controversy over what really constitutes an NGO (Fowler
1991; Tvedt 1998). Classical definitions tend to be normative and ideological,
or so broad that they make discussion and comparison difficult. For the
purpose of this report NGOs will be defined as “entities formed on a voluntary,
non-profit basis, dedicated to the provision of services or the construction of
social alternatives”. It includes NGOs in the classical sense as well as solidarity
organisations and churches in their extra-pastoral activities, but excludes labour
and professional unions, churches in their religious capacity and the media as
additional parts of civil society (Baranyi, Kible et al. 1999).
The number of non-governmental organisations in Africa has grown
substantially during past 20 years. This is often seen to have at least two
favourable impacts on the continent’s development (Fowler 1991:53). First,
NGOs will actively help mitigate the negative social effects of the prevailing
macro-economic policies on poor and vulnerable groups. And second, a
growing NGO sector will contribute to the needed democratisation of African
countries by pluralising and strengthening civil society.
NGOs are also often seen as embodying a number of comparative advantages
over governments and aid organisations for improving the situation of the poor
(the so-called “Articles of Faith”). They are more cost-effective in service
delivery, they have a greater ability to target poor and vulnerable sections of the
population, they demonstrate a capacity to develop community-based
institutions, and they are better able to promote the popular participation
needed for sustainability.
However, the status and role of NGOs have recently come under more critical
assessment. Tvedt (1998) argues that NGOs are not in general more flexible or
more efficient than governments. On the contrary, they may be less efficient and
less flexible in certain cases because they do not have the sanctions available to
governments, nor the “universalistic” approach that governments generally
adopt. There is also a gap between images of the NGO channel and what the
organisations are in fact able to achieve. Rather than alleviating poverty and
promoting equity NGOs perform a maintenance function, and may help
preserve differences among classes and reduce the pressure for more radical
reforms. Finally, the fact that most northern NGOs are increasingly dependent
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on government funding for their activities renders the very notion of “non-
government organisations” rather meaningless. Some of them also find
themselves in a grey zone between being development organisations and private
enterprises with profit motives.
6.2 A Brief Historical Overview
Defined in a broad sense, non-governmental organisations have been part of
Angolan society for centuries. Traditional communities boasted self-help
organisations independent of royal and later colonial powers; the churches and
missions in Angola had both social and advocacy roles in addition to their
religious activities; and associations, particularly in urban areas, represented the
embryo of what developed into organised resistance movements in the 1960s
(Tvedten 1997, Castello 2000).
After Independence from the Portuguese in 1975 and the introduction of the
centralised one-party state, emerging local associations and mass organisations
had important functions but were under strict government control. During the
1980s foreign organisations initiated relations with mass organisations as well
as the development wings of churches, but were defined as “solidarity
movements” and “cooperantes” rather than NGOs. Among the most important
national organisations were the Organização das Mulheres Angolanas (OMA),
União National de Trabalhadores Angolanos (UNTA), Caritas Angola and the
Angolan Council of Evangelical Churches (CAIE). The Canadian/French
Development Workshop, the Swedish Afrikagrupperna and the Norwegian
Peoples Aid were early foreign non-government organisations active in Angola.
The process towards peace, democratisation and liberalisation initiated in the
later 1980s came with increasing attention towards the role of civil society and
non-government organisations in the development process. External pressure
for political and economic reform following the end of the Cold War was
important, but so were internal developments. Both the Catholic and Protestant
churches issued statements at the end of 1989 calling for the war to stop and
the holding of free elections, and the Angolan Civic Association (ACA) was
formally launched in January 1990 with a clear advocacy objective. The
deteriorating support and respect for the party and public authorities became
noticeable at that time at all levels, and led to a number of attempts to form
independent associations (Sogge 1992).
The first signs of a changing attitude from the government towards NGOs as
independent organisations came with the establishment of Acção Angolana para
o Desenvolvimento (AAD) in November 1989 (albeit established by patrons
drawn from the MPLA political elite). From early 1991 the government started
to pass legislation recognising the rights of political parties, freedom of
assembly and association, the right to strike, freedom of the press etc. The Law
of Associations (Lei de Associação 14/91 of May 1991) was established to
regulate the activities of both national and foreign NGOs (see Appendix 4). The
law is brief and general in scope, but does represent a relatively strong legal
protection of civil society. The preamble to the law reads (Box 6):
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BOX 6
“A criação das condições materiais e técnicas para a edificação em Angola de um Estrado
democrático de direito é um dos objectivos a atingir, na actual fase de reformas politicas e
sociais.
Porém, a materialização de tal objectivo exige a participação activa e consciente de todos
os cidadões através das formas previstas na Lei Constitutional nomeadamente, no
exercício do direito da associação estabelecido pelo artigo 24 daquele lei.
Algumas das disposições, que nos artigos 167 e 184 do Código Civil regulavam essa
matéria, mostram-se desajustadas face ás novas exigências decorrentes da aplicação da
democracia, tendo em vista uma major participação da sociedade civil nos destinos da
Nação.
Tendo em conta que as associações prosseguem de entre outros, fins professioniais,
científicos, culurais, recreativos e que o seu âmbito pode ser nacional, regional ou local
conforme a extenção onde exerçam a sua actividade, todos os cidadões podem, nos limites
da lei, constituir associações, sendo estas autónomas, não havendo interferência dos
poderes públicos quanto à prossecuação dos seus fins”.
Source: Lei no. 14/91 (Diário da Republica, Sábado 11 de Maio de 1991).
On the other hand, Law 14/91 is not very specific on important issues such as
institutional responsibilities for the NGO sector in government structures, and
the rights and duties of the NGOs related to the practical implementation of
actual programmes and projects. The former implied that NGOs had to relate
to a number of different government bodies, and the latter implied considerable
confusion around the legal status of personnel, acquisition of goods and
services, import duties and taxes etc. In a Southern African regional context
there were at the time NGO laws that yielded more space and were more
specific on rights and duties, but there are also countries where the law was
more restrictive.
The government institutions themselves were also uncertain how to relate to the
emerging international and national NGOs. The system of public
administration was extremely weak, and the NGOs with their multifaceted
policies and purposes did not easily fit into any key ministry. The uncertainty is
evident by the changes in coordinating government bodies since the end of the
1980s, with the Ministry of External Relations, the Ministry of Planning, the
Ministry of Commerce (!) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration
being responsible at different points in time. The shifts were partly of a political
nature, but also reflect a genuine concern of how to accommodate large and
resourceful NGOs into weak government structures without relinquishing
national sovereignty.
To coordinate activities and undertake advocacy work with the government, the
Comité das Organicações Não-Governmentais em Angola (CONGA) was
established in early 1988. CONGA was initially dominated by foreign NGOs,
due both to their larger number and to their superior human and economic
resources. An alternative network (FONGA, Forum das ONGs Angolanas) was
established in 1991, primarily organising national NGOs. The split should at
least partly be seen as an expression of differences in objectives, capacity and
resources between the two categories of NGO.
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Despite the opening up of political space for NGOs, the number of both
international and national NGOs was initially relatively modest. This was
related to the continued uncertainty about political developments in Angola,
and a consequent reluctance by international NGOs to establish themselves in
the country. Already from the early 1990s, however, the establishment and
growth of national NGOs was closely linked to the number of international
NGOs. The former soon came to see the latter not only as professional
partners, but equally much as potential sources of funding.
With the resumption of war after the elections in late 1992, the politico-military
setting in Angola increasingly turned towards an emergency situation and the
democratic development received severe blows. UNITA could no longer claim
peaceful and democratic intentions, and there was increasing centralisation of
power in the hands of the President. The apparently contradictory effect of this
was an increase in the number of foreign NGOs, most of which were working
with emergency interventions. In fact, NGOs largely came to act as contractors
to donors and UN agencies.
With the increasingly important role of NGOs for emergency and development
interventions and their international legitimacy, the government had little
choice but to accept and relate to their presence as best they could. The
increasing presence of international NGOs also led to a new upsurge in the
number of national organisations. In 1996, 26 national and international
NGOs were officially registered. The national NGO scene was dominated by a
small number of well-funded and well-supported NGOs, such as AAD, the
Acção para Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA) and national
subsidiaries of large international NGOs such as the Red Cross and the YMCA.
Still, the large majority of national NGOs were small with limited competence,
capacity and funds.
Concerted efforts to enhance the capacity of national NGOs from multilateral
agencies, bilateral agencies and international NGOs were limited. In fact,
development institutions such as USAID had an explicit policy of not
supporting national capacity building, and even the Swedish International
Development Agency (SIDA) had restrictive policies in this regard.25 The
relatively few international NGOs primarily working with long-term
development, such as Development Workshop and African Humanitarian
Action (AHA), were exceptions to the rule with close relations to national
NGOs from the very beginning.
Towards the end of the 1990s, the number of international and national NGOs
again increased dramatically. With the continued uncertainty in the politico-
military situation and the inadequacy of government interventions,
international NGOs have maintained their central role both in multilateral and
bilateral aid with national NGOs following suit as best they can. In addition,
                                           
25 SIDA gave funds to DHE in the early 1990s for support to NGOs that only at a later stage
became accessible to national non-government organisations.
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the end of the 1990s saw an upsurge in the number of NGOs working with
human rights, as a result both of external pressure and support (primarily from
the UN and the US) and of increasing internal dissatisfaction with the human
rights situation in the country.
With this situation it is hardly surprising that many ordinary Angolans had
begun to see the NGOs and their donor patrons, rather than the state, as the
main providers of basic social services, humanitarian relief and resources for
rehabilitation. As argued earlier in this report, the willingness of donors and
NGOs to take on these responsibilities made it possible for the government to
divert oil income for other purposes. On the other hand, the situation was more
and more of an embarrassment to the government. It began losing legitimacy
not just in the eyes of the international community but also before its own
people. The population was in fact becoming increasingly less dependent on the
state (Hodges 2001:80).26
6.3 Political Space and Legal Context
At the beginning of 2001, the Technical Unit for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH) had registered 365 national and 95
international NGOs in Angola (see Appendices 5 and 6). The bulk of the
emergency aid is channelled through such organisations, they are extensively
used by bilateral aid organisations, they play an increasingly important role in
the advocacy of democracy and human rights, and even the Angolan
government has come to rely on them for policy implementation.27 The
increasing importance of NGOs takes place within a political power structure
that is susceptible to enhanced pressure for opening up more space for civil
society, and that at the same time is concerned about the implications of this for
their own sovereignty and political control.
To regulate and clarify the status and role of NGOs, the Government initiated
work with a new law on NGOs (Aprova o Código das Organizações Não
Governmentais) in 1996. At that time the activities of national as well as
international NGOs were still governed by the Law of Association discussed
above as the overall policy instrument, with other laws (on labour, procurement
of goods and services, taxation etc.) being applied for specific aspects of NGO
management and project implementation.
The initiative to develop a new NGO law originally came from the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS), with the international consulting
company KPGM as legal advisors. Neither CONGA or FONGA, nor individual
NGOs were part of the process. However, in 1997 the efforts to establish the
new law and its content became known to the NGOs. At the time the NGOs
were concerned not only with the lack of consultation as such, but also with
                                           
26 In the memory of most people the state had been important despite its deficiencies. Access to
state health and educational facilities did e.g. improve considerably after Independence, and
access to government-funded food rationing cards was vital up to 1990, particularly in urban
areas.
27 As an example, the Ministry of Agriculture largely depends on NGOs to distribute grain to
rural areas.
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aspects of the draft law that they found to restrict their activities rather than
create new space and clarify formal processes.28
Some 5-7 key NGOs under the joint auspices of FONGA and CONGA
subsequently became involved in a consultative process with the Government,
with their own legal advisor. The NGOs initially argued for working out the
new legal framework as regulations or provisions to the existing Law on
Associations (Regulamento para as ONGs Que Operam em Angola), rather
than a new law substituting the existing Law 91/14. This, they felt, would
safeguard political protection and make it possible to focus on regulations of
bureaucratic procedures that the NGOs had found to be particularly
cumbersome. With reference to the wide range of sectors in which the NGOs
work, FONGA/CONGA also argued for the establishment of a Permanent
Commission under the Council of Ministers (Comissão Permanente do
Conselho de Ministros) with principal responsibility for coordinating and
administrating the activities of NGOs. However, the proposals were not
supported by MINARS and the Ministry of Justice, and subsequent work
focused on improving the original government proposal.
The law had been in the making around four years with varying degrees of
involvement by the NGOs, when it was announced that a final proposal of the
NGO law would be presented to the Council of Ministers by the end of 2000
for approval.29 The final proposal disregarded many of the substantial
comments made by the NGOs. The NGOs had not only found it difficult to get
their views across to the political authorities, but also to the legal advisors from
KPMG, who had little or no experience from civil society and NGOs.
Regarding the issue of political space, the general tone of the law is considered
more restrictive than the existing law, and it contains several apparent
inconsistencies and issues that are not sufficiently clarified. This includes
apparently contradictory statements concerning the right to protect and
promote human rights (Article 4, 2b) on the one hand, and to refrain from
discussing political issues (Article 7, 5d) on the other. Equally serious from the
point of view of the NGOs is that the law does not resolve the day-to-day
problems experienced by most NGOs. On the contrary, the law outlines an
even more cumbersome system of rules and regulations and is vague on the
issue of institutional responsibilities.
As it turned out, the proposed law was rejected by the Council of Ministers in
November 2000, which can be interpreted as an indication of the political
uncertainty and sensitivity surrounding the status and role of NGOs still
existing. The fate of the law is currently uncertain. Some argue that the law will
be passed in its present form after a period of grace to make this politically
                                           
28 An indication of the objectives of the Law is found in the preamble, where it reads: “Nesta
base torna-se imprescindível o preenicimento desta lacuna regulamento todos os aspectos
desenvolvidos, num quadro jurídico que combalize a política de cooperação entre o Governo
Angolano e os seus parceiros Organizações Não Governmentais”.
29 A copy of the proposed law is available from CMI in Portuguese and a Norwegian
translation.
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feasible; some argue that the Law of Associations will remain in force for the
foreseeable future; and representatives of the NGOs claim that they will
continue to work for their original proposal of regulations under the existing
Law of Associations.
Administratively the national as well as international NGOs fall under
MINARS and UTCAH. MINARS has the overall responsibility for the
implementation of national policies related to humanitarian and development
aid, and UTCAH is responsible for the formal registration and supervision of
NGOs. Both institutions currently seem to have problems defining their real
status and role. With the large funds channelled through the emergency and aid
systems, other ministries see themselves as equally relevant for playing a
coordinating role. Furthermore, UTCAH’s position within the government
structures is also unclear with other line ministries continuing to be the most
important points of reference for many NGOs. UTCAH complains that the
organisation is not taken sufficiently seriously as a national authority,
particularly by the international NGOs.30 On top of all this, OCHA and UNDP
have de facto a much stronger influence on policy decisions and financial
allocations than MINARS and UTCAH.
For the NGOs the current political and legal context implies that they can
continue to work relatively independently, but in a situation of considerable
political uncertainty and practical difficulties. The future political space for
NGOs in Angola will depend on politico-military developments and how the
government relates to the internal and external pressure for a stronger civil
society. However, it will also depend on the policies and practice of the NGOs
themselves, and their own sensitivity to the Angolan political context.
6.5 National and International NGOs
There are considerable differences in the size, competence and capacity of the
365 national and 95 international NGOs currently registered with the UTCAH.
Informants with long-term experience from Angola and the work of NGOs
argue that no more than 40-50 national and 20-25 international NGOs are
seriously committed to Angola, and have the necessary competence and
capacity to continue to work in the country for a longer period of time.
This assessment is based on two assumptions. One is that the majority of
national NGOs are too weak and too dependent on external funding to be able
to develop into independent, strong and sustainable organisations in their own
right. The second is that a large number of the international NGOs have a
short-term perspective on their involvement, and are likely to leave the country
as soon as the emergency situation is over and accessible funds dry up. The
assumptions may be proven wrong, but this will necessitate a change in focus
                                           
30 Two particular points are mentioned. One is that most NGOs do not follow up their
reporting responsibilities to UTCAH. Another is that UTCAH is hardly ever invited by NGOs
for discussions, and the NGOs tend to send lower level administrative rather than management
personnel when called.
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by the international aid organisations towards transitional and long-term
development, and a stronger commitment from the government and
international aid organisations to support national NGOs.
6.5.1 National NGOs
Appendix 5 of this report lists the 365 registered national NGOs in Angola,
with their name, geographical location and main areas of concern.
To be legally registered, the NGOs must go through a relatively long and
cumbersome process. They have to fulfil specific criteria related to their
membership base; show that their objectives are in line with the Law of
Associations; and prove a certain financial viability. All NGOs also have to
present at least one project proposal. The formal registration is done both in the
Diario da República, and in the form of a certificate from the Ministry of
Justice. In some cases the process of registration has taken more than 4 years.
Given the cumbersome process of registration, many NGOs and CBDOs are
active without being formally certified. The total number of NGOs in Angola
has been estimated at close to one thousand.
Angolans establishing NGOs have different backgrounds and different
motivations. Much has been said about the dominance of supposedly egoistic
profit motives, but there are no compelling reasons to doubt the seriousness of
the large majority of NGOs. The majority of the national NGOs seem to spring
out of three main contexts, namely government structures, churches, and
individuals with a Bakongo background (so-called “regressados”). The latter
fits with a general Angolan perception of Bakongo being particularly
industrious, but many also have direct experience with various types of
association in Zaire and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Tvedten 1997,
Robson 2001).
The large majority of the national NGOs are based in Luanda, with other areas
of concentration being the provinces of Benguela, Huila and Huambo. The
heavy concentration in a limited number of provinces is primarily related to
population concentrations in the country and the history of war and insecurity.
It is also, however, related to conditions such as the attitude of provincial
authorities towards NGOs, and the preference of international funding agencies
(and hence national NGOs) to work “where the others are”.
A survey carried out by UNDP in 1999 defined 61 percent of the civic
organisations in Angola as NGOs (UNDP 1999).31 Of the 95 surveyed NGOs,
72 percent carried out work within the area of social services, 64 percent within
education, 59 percent in health, and 19 percent in civic education/advocacy
(many NGOs work with more than one sector). Projects related to social
services include support to displaced people (65 percent), emergency assistance
(43 percent), and sanitation and water supply (45 percent). As regards budgets
                                           
31 The remaining civic organisations were churches/religious organisations (16 percent), cultural
associations (11 percent), professional associations (4 percent), and labour unions (3,5 percent)
(UNDP 2000).
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and financial means, Table 13 gives a broad indication of access to financial
funds for the year 2000 among the national NGOs (the survey includes
registered NGOs only). As seen, close to 60 percent have budgets of USD
250,000 or less.
Table 13: Utilisation of Funds among National NGOs (%)
BUDGET IN USD,000 1997 1998 1999 2000
Up to 50 45 46 47 24
51-100 11 7 8 14
101-250 9 10 12 18
251-500 8 8 5 7
501-1000 7 10 9 11
1001-2500 13 11 8 13
more than 2500 8 8 12 13
Source: UNDP 2000.
As mentioned above, the Forum das ONGs Angolanas (FONGA) was
established in 1991 as an umbrella organisation primarily for national NGO
members. FONGA has a small secretariat of three persons (including the long-
term General Secretary Francisco Tunga Alberto). While the organisation
played an important role for the development of national NGOs throughout the
1990s, it has recently experienced problems of both an organisational and a
political nature. There is a perception that FONGA is becoming Luanda-based
rather than national in scope; that it is developing into a political forum serving
special interests;32 and that it has misunderstood its role by taking on projects in
competition with its own members. FONGA is currently trying to re-establish
itself as a forceful organisation, and has recently gone through a process of self-
evaluation (Jansen 2000).33
In addition to FONGA, some national NGOs have formed networks. The best
organised and best known network is Rede Mulheres/Angola (Box 8). This was
established in 1998, and currently counts 90 national and international member
organisations. The network has received financial support from a number of
institutions, including the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA),
and builds competence and capacity among its member organisations. The Rede
das Criancas was established in 2000, and is still in the process of developing
organisational structures and principles.
                                           
32 The accusations vary from FONGA being too close to the ruling party, to being an instrument
for regressados.
33 One strategy not discussed in the self-evaluation is to limit membership only to include the
most viable NGOs. While there are pros and cons for such a strategy, it would probably make
FONGA into a more coherent and stronger organisation.
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Box 8
A Rede Mulher/Angola é o forum sobre a mulher e género, uma organisazão de carácter
não governmental, apartidária sem fins lucrativos e com autonomia administrativa e
finançeira, constituida formalmente em 04 de Agosto de 1998 em Luanda e de âmbito
nacional. A missão da Rede Mulher é de contribuir para o formoção da igualdade entre
homens e mulheres. Persegue os objectivios seguintes:
· Criar uma Rede de Comunicação, Informação e Troca de Experiência Sobre as
Questões de Género e Desenvolvimento
· Reforçar a capacidade Institutional dos Membros, Parceiros (governmental e
paramentar) sobre as Questões de Género e Desenvolvimento
· Fazer Lobby e Advocacía Junto das Entidades Governmentais e Paramentares Sobre a
Problemática do Género e Desenvolvimento
· Facilitar a Conjugação de Esforços e de Recursos Humanos, Finançeiros Técnico
Materiais e Jurídicos que visem reforçar as organizações membros.
Source: O Que é Rede Mulher/Angola, Luanda 2001
The national NGO scene has been dominated by the Acção para o
Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiénte (ADRA), which in terms of personnel,
resources and project portfolio has been far superior to other NGOs. ADRA is
involved in emergency aid, development work and capacity building of Angolan
NGOs. The focus is currently on the Programa de Desenvolvimento
Institutional (PDI). ADRA is well funded, and works for a large number of
different clients.34
An informal survey carried out for this study among some of the international
and national NGOs, multilateral and bilateral aid agencies identified
Associação Christã da Sociedade (ACM), Solidariedade Cristã de Ajuda Mutua
(SCAM), Acção Cristã de Jovens de Angola (ACJ), Acção pela Vida (APV),
Acção para a Promoção Social (APS) and Club de Jovens (Huíla) as other
strong national NGOs in addition to ADRA. There are also a number of NGOs
“in the making”. Most of these grow on the basis of a combination of their
own hard work, and constructive relations with external funding agencies.
Among these are the Associação Juvenil para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário
de Angola (AJUDECA), Kassulos do Maculusso Association (AKM), and Ninho
da Infância/TRINDADE.
The church-based organisations represent a special category of NGOs, due to
the strong position of both Catholic and Protestant churches in Angola. This
position not only makes it possible to implement development projects with
both political and popular support, but has also put the churches in a situation
where they can do active advocacy work for peace and reconciliation without
running the same risks as others would. Nevertheless, representatives of the
church-based organisations argue that the churches are still not sufficiently
strong and well organised to represent a real political force at a national level.
                                           
34 In the process of growing from a small NGO to a large development organisation ADRA has
(in line with many other organisations in similar situations) experienced internal unrest related
both to its objectives and to its partners of cooperation. Several employees have recently left the
organisation.
C M I
37
The Catholic development organisation CARITAS is the largest church-based
development organisation, with representations in practically all provinces.
Traditionally, the Catholic Church has been closest to the ruling party MPLA.
The evangelical churches are organised into Acção das Igrejas em Angola (AIA),
an ecumenical aid consortium of Angolan churches, national NGOs and
northern Christian agencies working to provide effective and co-ordinated
support for relief, rehabilitation and long-term development. Members include
AEA (Alliança dos Evangelicos de Angola) and CICA (Conselho de Igrejas
Christãs de Angola). 35
A final category of national NGOs are those working with human rights issues.
Having been sanctioned throughout the 1990s, they are still few in number.
Most of them are supported financially by the United Nations Office in Angola
(UNOA) or USAID. The Human Rights NGOs are primarily following up
human rights violations in the legal system, and doing advocacy work. A good
example is Mao Livres, an organisation created in 2000 with UNOA support
and with lawyers and journalists as key members. The organisation has its own
programme on the national radio, and a separate page to air their views and
answer questions in the daily Journal de Angola.
Having presented some of the stronger national NGOs, the large majority of
Angolan NGOs are still small with limited capacity and financial means,
depending on funding from external sources, and with unclear goals and
working strategies. While most of these are likely to have a short lifespan, there
is still a large number with a sufficient potential in terms of human resources
and social base to become important given the right type of support. The main
strengths of these organisations are their first-hand experience with Angolan
society, their cultural competence and the importance of succeeding both for
altruistic and personal reasons. Their main weaknesses seem to be related to
general administration, project formulation and budgeting.
6.5.2 International NGOs
Most of the world’s largest and best known international NGOs (AAA, CARE
International, OXFAM, Save the Children, MSF, ACORD, GTZ etc.) are
present in Angola, with the total number currently being 95 (see Appendix 6).
The majority of these primarily work with emergency-related and transitional
interventions, with a minority concentrating on longer-term development aid.
None of the international NGOs have human rights advocacy as the principal
objective of their work, even though some (like Development Workshop and
Trocaire) do work related to peace and reconciliation.36
According to the UNDP study referred to above (UNDP 1999), the majority of
the international NGOs have budgets exceeding USD 500.000 (see Table 14).
                                           
35 Also the Ireja Kimbanguista em Angola (IKA) is a member. The Kimabanguista Church was
founded by Simon Kimbangui in Zaire in 1921. Being an “African “ church and having been
regarded as political both because of its ideology emphasising self-reliance and its strong links
with the Bakongo in northern Angola, it was actively suppressed during the one-party state era.
36 This is primarily done through a promising Peace-building Programme, involving a large
number of Angolan civil society organisations.
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The study also points out that the international NGOs normally have weak
links both with the state and with the private sector in Angola. Most of the
NGOs are primarily funded by the governments in their respective countries of
origin, and have close professional relations with their own bilateral aid agency
in cases where that is relevant.
Table 14: Utilisation of Funds among International NGOs
BUDGET IN USD ,000 1997 1998 1999 2000
Up to 50 4 4
51-100 9 12 4
101-250 17 4 12 14
251-500 9 12 4
501-1000 13 23 28 29
1001-2500 44 31 28 38
more than 2500 9 15 20 19
Source: UNDP 2000.
A further assessment of the work of the international NGOs in Angola is
beyond the scope of this report, but there is little doubt that they are vital for
both emergency and development interventions in the current situation in
Angola37. Special mention should be made of Development Workshop which
has, through its long-term presence, close collaboration with the government
and national NGOs and sustained leadership, developed a unique position
among the international NGOs (see Box 10). The largest NGO in terms of
funding is Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), with activities in humanitarian aid,
long-term development as well as demining (see Section 6.7).
Box 10
Development Workshop has been working in Angola since 1981, and was for many years
the only NGO in the country. DW first came to Angola at the national government’s
request to assist in developing policies and programs for self-help housing. Subsequently,
DW participated with local government and community based partners in the first
integrated squatter upgrading programme in the musseque (informal settlement) in Luanda.
DW has adopted a strategy of working closely with local government and community
organisations. DW’s assistance has been instrumental in building the capacity of Angolan
civil society partners during the crucial years since 1991. DW’s current Angola programme
focus is on peri-urban communities where infrastructure and other basic services are
virtually non-existent and on support for rehabilitation of social infrastructure in war
affected areas in the provinces.[]
The programme strategy for Angola supports the institutional strengthening of national
NGOs, community-based organisations, churches and local government authorities.
Source: ”Development Workshop 2000”
                                           
37 The work of the major NGOs in Angola is presented on their respective web pages. There
seem to be curiously few external evaluations of their activities.
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The Comité das Organicações Não-Governmentais em Angola (CONGA) has,
as mentioned above, developed into a joint forum primarily for international
NGOs. The leadership function circulates among the main NGOs, and
CONGA has not had a permanent secretariat. While this has implied a
distribution of responsibility and work between several organisations, it has
also reduced their impact both among international NGOs themselves and in
their relation to the government and national NGOs. Another weakness is that
the most active NGOs are those with the longest experience in Angola, while
the NGOs with the most limited experience who would benefit most from
active participation are much less involved (the latter group includes most of the
Norwegian NGOs). Key players in CONGA have realised these problems, and a
new CONGA Reformada is in the process of being established, with a small
liaison group and an information officer.
While the large NGOs are important particularly for implementing emergency
and transitional aid, many of them isolate themselves and carry out activities
largely on their own or with other foreign partners. This is partly related to the
difficult political context and the lack of government structures and a viable
private sector, but it also reflects the way many of them work globally (Ridell
and Kruse 1997). Added to this is the principle in many of the large
international NGOs of revolving their top management, with negative
implications for continuity. The limited transparency and emphasis on public
relations has contributed to relatively widespread perceptions in Angolan
society of international NGOs being “rich islands in an ocean of poverty”, and
of large parts of their funding going to salaries and expensive cars.
6.6 Building Competence and Capacity
Most international NGOs have a stated goal of working closely with national
NGOs. This is done with reference to the relevance and efficiency of the work
they do in Angola, as well as the importance of strengthening local civil
institutions in the country as a goal in itself.
There are many indications that cooperation with and capacity building of
national NGOs is weaker in Angola than in most other countries in the region.
Two reasons for this pointed out by the international NGOs themselves are i)
that with a few exceptions the competence and capacity of the national NGOs
is very weak and strengthening their capacity will imply too much time, effort
and resources, and ii) that in emergency situations like the one in Angola
implementing projects and saving lives has to be given higher priority than the
longer-term goal of capacity building.
Capacity building takes place through two main mechanisms. One is by
involving Angolan NGOs and individuals directly in the work of international
aid organisations including NGOs. While there are many Angolans employed in
the international NGOs in administrative and practical functions, very few
Angolans have higher management positions in these organisations. OIKOS-
Cooperação e Desenvolvimento is the only one with an Angolan director. Some
(including Development Workshop) have Angolans in senior and middle
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management positions, who have influence in terms of their long-term
experience and employment with the organisation.
A second mechanism for capacity building is training through special courses or
other similar interventions. There has been a large number of such initiatives
the past few years. The most comprehensive have been implemented by UNDP,
and PACT (“Private Agencies Collaborating Together Inc.”) funded by USAID.
The programmes are based on courses in basic management, including issues of
project formulation, budgeting, general management, communication
techniques and project implementation. NGOs are selected for participation
through comprehensive selection processes. The currently most comprehensive
effort is the Programa de Desenvolvimento Institutional (PDI), carried out by
ADRA and partially funded by NORAD (see Box 11).
A large number of NGOs have gone through courses of this type. However, the
problem remains that very few of these organisations manage to come in
positions where they can try out what they have learnt and gain experience as
NGOs. Independent funding is difficult to obtain, and still largely depends on
establishing partnerships with international NGOs. When funding is received,
moreover, there are normally no overheads making it possible for the NGOs to
maintain activities in between projects.
Box 11
Embora haja organizações em Angola que pretendam trabalhar a numa linha de
desenvolvimento participativo, comunitário e sustentável, os seus procedimentos,
metodologias e práticas de trabalho com as comunidades contrariam isso. Deriva daí a
necessidade de se melhjorar a capacidade de intervenção destas organizações. Este resultado
constitui uma das prioridades da ADRA neste nova fase do Programe de desenvolvimento
Institucional (PDI) face a necessidade da organização melhor contribuit oara o reforço da
sociadade civil, aspecto nuclear da sua missão institutional. Serão prioridados quatro níveis
de acções:
· Reforço da capacidade das ONG, associações e outras organizações formais.
· Reforço da acção no âmbito das redes/forums traduzida num maior envolvimento/
participação da ADRA
· Reforço do trabalho com as organizações comunitárias de base a outras organizaões
informais.
· Reforço do trabalho da ADRA com instituções do Estado especialmente a n\ivel local
[] e com as autoridades “tradicionais”
Source:ADRA: PDI – Sede Proposat de Continuidade. Luanda 2000
6.7 Norwegian NGOs and NGO Support
NGOs have always had a central place in Norwegian development aid. In 2000
a total of 60 NGOs received NOK 1,056 mn in support through NORAD,
which represents around 25 percent of the total bilateral aid budget. Some of
the organisations involved in emergency aid receive additional funding from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For all these organisations, government support
represented at least 80 percent of their budgets for development aid.
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The five largest NGOs involved in development aid in Norway are (in order of
received NORAD funding in 2000): the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), the
Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), Save the Children Norway, the Norwegian Red
Cross, and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Together, these
organisations received a total of NOK 382,625,000.
The NGOs have a special and in many ways privileged position in Norwegian
aid, despite their heavy dependence on government funding. Until a
considerable cut in government funding to NGOs in 2000 there were few
economic constraints on the level of activity, and they have been given wide
authority to plan, implement and evaluate their own programmes and projects.
In 2000 NORAD funded (fully or partially) a total of approximately 1600
individual projects carried out by Norwegian NGOs. Only a small proportion
of these were evaluated on the initiative of NORAD.
Support to national NGOs is a stated objective in Norwegian development aid,
with reference to their importance for effective and relevant development
interventions as well as the importance of supporting the development of civil
society as a goal in itself. This has primarily been done through partnerships
between Norwegian and national NGOs, but there has been an increasing
awareness in Norad of the alternative of supporting national NGOs directly. A
total of 309 local NGOs received direct support for approximately 400
individual projects in 1999. Total allocations to national NGOs were between
NOK 60-70 mn in 2000.
Norwegian NGOs get support through framework agreements with NORAD,
through country or regional allocations, and (in the case of emergency-related
activities) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The NGOs often cooperate with
national NGOs as part of their own project implementation. Direct NORAD
support to national NGOs may be given either through country agreement
allocations (for Norway’s main partners of cooperation), through regional
allocations (used for countries that are not main partners of cooperation
including Angola), or by way of direct support from NORAD in Oslo
administered by the embassies (Budget Post 1547110).
Norwegian NGOs have always had a central place in development cooperation
with Angola. The reasons for this have been the difficulty of longer-term
bilateral commitments with the unstable politico-military situation, and the
problems experienced with the Angolan management of bilateral agreements. In
fact, the cooperation between the Norwegian Fishery Directorate and the
Angolan Ministry of Fisheries, and the Norwegian Oil Directorate and the
Angolan Ministry of Petroleum, are currently the only bilateral programmes
being implemented.
All the five major Norwegian NGOs mentioned above have activities in Angola.
In addition, smaller NGOs such as YME, the International Child Development
Programme (ICDP) and the Norwegian Union of Teachers (NL) are active in
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the country. The names of the NGOs and their financial allocations from
MFA/NORAD in 2000 are given in Table 15. 38
Table 15: NORAD Support to Norwegian NGOs in Angola, 2000
NORWEGIAN NGO NORAD MFA TOTAL
Norwegian Peoples Aid 20,949,000 20,949,000
Norwegian Church Aid 2,000,000 2,000,000
Save the Children Norway 2,800,000 2,800,000
Norwegian Refugee
Council
8,958,000 14,232,000 23,190,000
Norwegian Red Cross 7,000,000 7,000,000
ICDP 4,400,000 4,400,000
YME 583,000 583,000
NL 310.600 310,600
Trauma Care Foundation 348,000 348,000
Others 39 595,000 595,000
Source: Norwegian Embassy, Angola.
· The Norwegian Peoples Aid (NP) has worked in Angola since 1988.
Originally their programme was related to rural development interventions
with a particular focus on water supply, health and education, but the
demining programme is now by far the largest component
(www.folkehjelp.no).
· The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) gives humanitarian assistance to
refugees and internally displaced people, and has a large educational
programme primarily directed at children through the Teacher Emergency
Package (TEP). They initiated their work in Angola in 1995 (www.nrc.no).
· The Norwegian Red Cross gives financial support to the International
Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and International Federation of the Red
Cross (IFRC) in Angola, but also takes more direct part in an integrated
health programme in Kwanza Sul in collaboration with the regional Red
Cross organisation (www.redcross.no).
· The Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) has been active in Angola since 1986,
mainly through financial and project support to local church organisations
(such as the Church Action in Angola [CAA] and the Angolan Council of
Christian Churches [CICA]), but also more directly to emergency assistance
and rehabilitation for internally displaced people through the Lutheran
World Federation (www. nca.no).
                                           
38 The Norwegian Methodist Church is the Norwegian institution with the longest experience
from Angola, dating back to 1949 when the first Norwegian missionary came to Kessua in
Malanje. Health and agricultural projects were implemented from 1978, with support from
NORAD. A large school rehabilitation project (POSOCA) was started in Luanda in 1993. The
current activities in Luanda include a programme for street children.
39 Includes support to send children to Norway Cup in soccer (NOK 260,000) and Verket Cup
in handball (NOK 335,000).
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· Save the Children Norway initiated its programme in Angola in 1997, but
prior to that channelled aid through Save the Children UK. The organisation
primarily supports basic education and does advocacy work related to the
rights of children (www.reddbarna.no).
· Finally the International Child Development Programme (ICDP) is involved
in work with traumatised children; YME is involved in work with water
supply to local areas in the provinces of Cabinda and Luanda
(www.yme.no); and the Norwegian Union of Teachers is involved in
capacity building with the sister union Sindicato National de Professores
(SINPROF) in Angola.40
Norway also channels aid through international NGOs in Angola. As discussed
earlier, a major part of the support to multilateral agencies (OCHA, UNDP,
WFP, UNICEF etc.) is implemented by such organisations. NORAD has
influence on the utilisation of these funds though their involvement in the
annual Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (UN 2000). NORAD also gives
direct support to the international NGOs Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF),
TROCAIRE, Development Workshop and Ibis. The bulk of the Norwegian aid
money directly or indirectly channelled through international NGOs goes to
emergency-related interventions (see Table 16).
Table 16: NORAD Support to International NGOs
INTERNATIONA NGOs 2000
Trocaire/UNOA-HRD 2,230,000
Development Workshop (Church initiative) 1,500,000
Development Workshop (Culture) 500,000
Ibis (Culture) 500,000
Source: The Norwegian Embassy, Angola.
The direct support to national NGOs is primarily taken from the regional
allocation, and is hence part of the regular planning and reporting procedures.
There are also options for obtaining additional NORAD funding to national
NGOs through special budget allocations such as allocation 1547110 (“Direct
Support via the Embassies”), but the Embassy currently does not make use of
this. The largest local recipient of Norwegian development aid is currently
ADRA, receiving NOK 3.7 mn for its Institutional Development Programme
(PDI) in 2000. Other national NGOs receiving Norwegian support are Church
Action Angola and Rede de Mulher (the Angolan Lawyer Association and the
research institution AIP are not NGOs per se even though they work with
NGOs) (Table 17).
                                           
40 For more background information to the history of Norwegian NGOs in Angola, see Tvedten
1996.
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Table 17: NORAD Support to National NGOs
NATIONAL NGOs 2000
The Angolan Lawyer Association 36,000
Angola-Instituto de Pesquisa Económico e Social 1,422,000
ADRA 2,700,000
Church Action Angola (CAA) 114,000
Rede da Mulher 33,000
Source: The Norwegian Embassy, Angola.
All the Norwegian NGOs have clear policies of working closely with national
NGOs through partnerships. These are emphasised by the management in the
central offices in Norway, and most of the NGOs also have written policy
statements regarding cooperation with local partners.
However, the representations in Angola argue that it is very difficult to live up
to these policies in Angola with reference to i) difficulties of identifying proper
partners of cooperation, ii) the weak competence and capacity of those they are
familiar with, and iii) the need to give priority to effective project
implementation given the serious problems of poverty and vulnerability in the
country.
Another reason for the limited cooperation with national NGOs seems to be the
relative isolation of the Norwegian NGOs from other parts of the aid milieu in
Angola. None of them take an active part in CONGA, where they would be
able to draw on important information from the more experienced and active
non-governmental organisations. Most of them also have limited contacts with
the multilateral and bilateral aid organisations, including NORAD.
Having said this, there seems to be individual differences in their real
commitment to establish such relations:
· Save the Children Norway show the strongest commitment by demanding
that all projects and programmes shall be implemented in partnership with
local NGOs. The organisation currently attempts to do this through active
involvement in the recently established “Rede das Criancas”.
· Norwegian Church Aid has shown in practice that they are committed to
interventions through partnerships, by having implemented all their
activities in the past 15 years through local sister organisations.
· Norwegian Red Cross works with international and national Red Cross
organisations as a matter of both principle and practice, and has consistently
done so in Angola.
· Norwegian Peoples Aid argues that they have a clear goal of working more
closely with national NGOs, but that this is difficult and that they cannot
find organisations with the necessary competence and capacity. They also
emphasise the need to follow up national partners closely, particularly in
their financial management.
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· The Norwegian Refugee Council does not emphasise cooperation with local
institutions (except with churches and mission stations that help them with
practicalities when they initiate work in new locations). They argue that
work with national NGOs is not as relevant for organisations like NRC
doing emergency-related work.
None of the Norwegian NGOs in Angola invest in capacity building of national
NGOs as an objective in its own right. There does not seem to be a tradition for
this among Norwegian NGOs, and they do not have particular qualifications in
this area. Some also argue that it is difficult to obtain funding for projects with
outputs as vague as “institutional development” and “capacity building”.41
With such a point of departure, cooperation with national NGOs easily comes
to be seen as hindering effective project implementation and as an additional
burden to a workload that is already considerable.
Given the overall objective of contributing to social and economic development
in Angola, it is important to assess the utility of closer cooperation with
national NGOs not only in terms of immediate effects on project
implementation, but also in terms of its effect on the longer-term development
in the country. It is our assessment that considerably more could be done both
by NORAD and by the Norwegian NGOs to support the development of
Angolan non-government organisations.42 There is, as we see it, a sufficient
number of national NGOs with potential competence and capacity to make
such an effort feasible.
                                           
41 Institutional development is, of course, an increasingly important part of Norwegian
development aid, and useful ways of measuring their output have been identified (see Tvedten
et.al 1997).
42 Institutional capacity building of national NGOs through “twinning” seems to fit well with
the objectives of the new Norwegian Peace Corps (“Fredskorpset”)
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7. Conclusions
National and international NGOs in Angola are part of a complex political
setting in constant change. Their status and role cannot only be assessed by
focussing on the impact of their programmes and projects in isolation. Equally
important is the question of how they relate to other parts of Angolan society.
For a sustainable recovery, the state, the civil society and the private sector all
have to interrelate constructively.
As we have discussed in this and the preceding report (Tvedten 2000), the state
and the private sector in Angola are currently extremely weak, leaving political
and social space for a civil society defined broadly as “informal and formal
institutions between the state and the household that are not private enterprises
with profit motives”.
We know far too little about the informal components of civil society in
Angola, in the form of traditional institutions, local associations, social
relations and networks, except that they are probably extremely important for
peoples’ daily coping strategies both in urban and rural areas.
The space for formal civil society institutions was, as shown in this report,
enhanced with the process of democratisation and liberalisation in the early
1990s. It is not difficult to find support for arguments that despite this, the
church, professional and labour unions, the media and NGOs have functioned
under very difficult conditions throughout the 1990s. There is a large number
of examples of political repression and serious human rights violations on the
part of the government (see e.g. Tvedten 1997, Vines 1999, Hodges 2001).
It is, however, also possible to identify incidents indicating that civil society has
captured space and plays an increasingly important role in Angola. The
churches are increasingly pulling in one direction, as demonstrated by joint
organisations and a number of initiatives for peace and reconciliation. Labour
unions are still weak, but professional unions (as for teachers and lawyers) have
been able to influence events through concerted action. And despite serious
setbacks in the form of assassinated journalists and closed newspapers, the
Angolan media do produce critical articles about political and social issues.
In this context, national NGOs have an important role to play both for social
development and for human rights. They represent a broad spectrum of social
categories and interest groups, and have a flexibility that may make them into
effective development agents and human rights advocates. To be able to have an
influence for development and human rights, we will argue that the NGOs must
strike a balance between relating constructively to the state, the private sector
and other parts of civil society and working for alternative development
strategies and radical change.
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The international community, including international NGOs, has a particular
responsibility for contributing towards such a process. For NORAD and
Norwegian NGOs, the following should be more closely assessed:
· NORAD should take more initiatives for following up and evaluating
NGOs than they currently do, in order to secure the necessary quality of
their work.
· NORAD should give stronger emphasis to the responsibility of Norwegian
NGOs to develop national NGOs’ capacity.
· NORAD should require that all programme and project applications from
Norwegian NGOs include cooperation with a national NGO.
· NORAD should be more willing to allocate funds to NGO institutional
development projects, even if this implies a certain risk and less tangible
outputs.
· NORAD should make the budget post 1547110 (“Direct Support via the
Embassies”) more readily accessible to all Embassies.
· NORAD should assess the option of making “twinning” between
Norwegian and national NGOs an important part of the “New Peace
Corps” (Nye Fredskorpset).
· Norwegian NGOs in Angola should put stronger emphasis on building the
capacity and competence of Angolan NGOs.
· Norwegian NGOs in Angola should include cooperation with national
NGOs in all their programmes and projects in the country.
· Norwegian NGOs in Angola should take a more active part in national and
international NGO organisations and networks, in order to enhance their
own competence and capacity.
· Norwegian NGOs in Angola should include more Angolans in management
positions.
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Annex 2:
Terms of Reference Country Report, Part I
1. Background
NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledge the need for
assistance from external resources in the form of reviews of economic, social,
political and cultural conditions in selected countries of principal co-operation
to augment Norwegian country specific knowledge. This country report is
intended to be one such devise for increased knowledge.
2. Objectives
The objectives of this kind of report is to complement NORAD’s and the
Embassies’ knowledge about the selected countries of principal co-operation by
increasing the understanding of economic and social conditions in the selected
countries of principal co-operation and thereby increasing the competence to
deal with economic, institutional and social problems.
As the amount of information and documentation from competent local and
international organisations and agencies is huge, the need for external topical
competence is to synthesise, analyse and evaluate the available information, to
analyse general developmental trends, and possibly to participate in planning
processes. Furthermore, in order to acquire an overall perspective of the present
situation in these countries, it is also important to address other issues such as
historical, cultural, sociological and political aspects.
3. Scope of work
To generate information to establish the necessary background knowledge, the
work shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, presenting and assessing
the following:
1. Economic and institutional indicators:
· the selected countries’ present economic performance by looking at macro-
economic trends, strengths and weaknesses;
· possible bottlenecks to development of the economic sector;
· current trends in national plans, policies and strategies to improve economic
performance;
· ongoing administrative reforms (Civil Service Reforms, Public Expenditure
Reforms) and assess the domestic capacity, the resources available and the
political will to undertake administrative reforms;
· trends in public expenditures and income;
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· trends in bilateral and international agencies’ on-going and planned
assistance to the country.
2. Social, political and cultural indicators
· the development in social indicators;
· to briefly describe obstacles to an effective implementation of development
programmes;
· political will to reform the political system and to consolidate democracy,
human rights and equality and to alleviate poverty.
The work shall be carried out through:
· desk studies;
· discussions with the authorities, local NGOs, and local researchers as well as
bilateral and international development agencies;
· field visits to relevant business communities, libraries, universities and research
communities.
4. Reporting
The reports are mainly for sue by NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as a tool to increase the quality and the effectiveness of the Norwegian
development assistance to selected countries.
A draft report shall be presented NORAD for comments not later than two
weeks after departure from the country to which NORAD shall submit
comments within two weeks. A final report shall be presented to NORAD not
later than two weeks after comments have been received from NORAD.
An oral presentation of the draft report shall be undertaken both to inform
NORAD about the work process and to facilitate a discussion of the draft
report to provide comments to the draft.
The report shall be written in English. NORAD shall receive 6 copies of the
final report.
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Annex 3:
Terms of Reference: Country Report Angola 2000/2001,
Part II
Background:
NORAD, as well as other donors, has in recent years channelled a substantial
part of its development aid to Angola through international NGOs. Local
NGOs have so far mainly been partners in smaller projects or indirectly through
international NGOs and UN agencies. The effectiveness of NGOs as
development agents depends heavily on the environment and framework they
are working in and their ability to co-ordinate between themselves, with the UN
agencies and with governmental institutions on all levels.
The "Law on Associations" from 1991 at the present formally regulates NGO
activities. For the last three years (approximately) a new law specific for NGOs
has been under preparation. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration
(MINARS) and NGOs have developed a participatory approach to the
formulation of the law. Both the international and national NGOs umbrella
organisations (CONGA and FONGA) have been involved and a working group
with three representatives from each has been formed. The working group has
regular contact with UTCAH, which is the responsible unit in MINARS.
Scope of work:
The report should analyse the legal, political and economic framework for
NGOs working in Angola.  Included in this the governmental policy towards
national and international NGOs should be highlighted. Governmental
institutions, national and international NGOs should be consulted to get their
view on the environment for NGOs to act as effective and co-ordinated
development agents under the present conditions and under the new law which
is being elaborated. The specific co-ordination mechanisms in place should be
evaluated and strengths and weaknesses discussed.
The Embassy will set up meetings with governmental institutions, UN agencies
and national and international NGOs.
Summary
ISSN 0805-505X
ISBN 82-90584-90-3
This is the second report on Angola under the Country
Advisor Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation (NORAD) and Chr. Michelsen
Institute (CMI) and Nordic Consulting Group (NCG). The
report consists of a Part I synthesising and assessing existing
information regarding economic, political and social
developments in Angola, and a Part II focusing on the role
of national and international NGOs in the country. The
number of NGOs has increased substantially since the
introduction of the new democratic constitution in 1991.
While they play an increasingly important role in emergency
and development aid, they also occupy political space that
is contested.
